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INTRODUCTION: THE CoNTRovEmS

The secured credit carve outs proposed by Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried in their Yale Law Journalarticle,' and by Professor Elizabeth Warren in her Memorandum to the Council of the
American Law Institute, 2 are in most respects quite similar. Perhaps
the principal difference is that Bebchuk and Fried proposed that their
carve out apply only in bankruptcy, 3 while Warren proposed that her
carve out be part of Article 9 and therefore effective both in and out
t Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and A. Robert Noll Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School. I thank Leon Foreman, Frances Foster, Kathryn Heidt, Ronald
Mann, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Westbrook, and the participants in the Harvard Law School
Symposium on the Priority of Secured Debt for their comments on earlier drafts.
1 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857 (1996).
2 Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School,
to the Council of the American Law Institute (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author).
3 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 924.
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of bankruptcy. 4 Participants in the Article 9 revision process raised a
host of objections, the most strenuous being that even if the carve out
were desirable, it should be effective only in bankruptcy. 5
The objectors put forth three arguments. First, any carve out enacted should be part of bankruptcy law rather than the Uniform Commercial Code so that it would apply to both real and personal

property. 6 Applying the carve out only to personal property would
distort investment incentives. 7 Real estate lenders would have recourse to all of their collateral while personal property lenders would
have recourse to only 75%8 of theirs. 9 Second, if the carve out would
apply to personal property but not real property, the law would have
to distinguish the two, which would not be an easy task.10 Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, the Director of the American Law Institute, made
the third objection in a foreword to a discussion draft of Article 9. It
summarized the contention of "the proponents of the [d]raft:"
4 Letter from Elizabeth Warren to the Council of the American Law Institute, supra
note 2.
5 See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Fleming, President of the Equipment Leasing Association, to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director of the American Law Institute 2
(Nov. 7, 1996) (on file with author) ("We agree with you that the Bankruptcy Code is a
better place than the UCC for considering the Proposal."); Letter from Leon S. Forman,
Esq., Counsel, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, to Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 1-2 (July 1, 1996) (on file with author) (expressing
serious concerns with Warren's proposal and stating that "there is more merit in a bankruptcy solution where a deduction might automatically be made from the proceeds of collateral held by a secured creditor.., on all the assets of an appropriate percentage for the
benefit of the estate."); Letter from Jay L. Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business
Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law, to Lynn M. LoPucki, A. Robert Noll
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School 1 (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with author) ("Article 9
itself should provide for a carve-out in case of an insolvency proceeding, which would normally be a bankruptcy.").
6 See, e.g., Letter from Howard Ruda, Esq., Counsel, Hahn and Hessen LLP, to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., University of Pennsylvania School of Law 4 (May 22, 1996) (on file with
author) (concurring that "the Bankruptcy Code is the better place to limit secured lending
if it is to be limited," and noting that "the universal applicability of the Bankruptcy Code
would permit subjecting real property interests to the 20% rule. I see no economic reason
for the Rule distinguishing between reality and personalty.").
7

See id.

8

The Warren Proposal calls for a 20% carve out, Letter from Elizabeth Warren to
the Council of the American Law Institute, supra note 2, at 5, and the Bebchuk-Fried proposal, for a 25% carve out, Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 909. I have used the
Bebchuk-Fried percentage because I address primarily the Bebchuk-Fried proposal.
9 See, e.g., Letter from Howard Ruda to Geoffrey C. Hazard, supra note 6, at 4.
10
See, e.g., id. ("Indeed, in the case of a plant mortgage I see substantial transactional
difficulties in only applying the 20% Rule to the equipment (including fixtures?) component of the mortgage."). Thus far, the law has had little success in drawing the line between real and personal property. See 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 33-8 (4th ed. 1995) (describing the numerous tests for distinguishing
fixtures from nonfixtures and concluding that "there is more than one line of authority,
and.., the lawyer must examine the cases with care to arrive at a reasonable guess about
what is and what is not a fixture").
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[T] he proper legal regime through which to protect various rivals
of secured creditors is elsewhere, in the law of bankruptcy. That is,
it makes little sense to impose obstacles on creation of security arrangements, which have no adverse effect at all on unsecured creditors in the normal relationship with businesses that continue to be
viable. Rather, the place for legal intervention to protect such creditors is where conflict has actually materialized between the competing interests of various classes of creditors. Hence, if additional
protection needs to be provided to unsecured creditors-or any
other class of claimants, for that matter-the matter should be addressed by amending the bankruptcy law. 1

The first two objections are easily disposed of for the purposes of
this Article. They do not in fact require that the carve out apply only
in bankruptcy; they would be adequately met by expanding Warren's
proposal to real property.' 2 This Article addresses only the third
objection.
The problems that result when a substantive rule of law-particularly a rule of priority-applies only in bankruptcy were the subject of
a 1987 debate between Professor Elizabeth Warren and Professor
Douglas Baird in a pair of essays in the University of Chicago Law Review. i 3 Prior to that debate, Baird and Professor Thomas Jackson proposed the "creditor's bargain" theory of bankruptcy.' 4 That theory
posited that creditors' rights should be the same in and out of bankruptcy, except as necessary to solve the creditors' collective action

11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REvIsED ARTIcLE 9 at xv-xvi (Discussion Draft Apr. 16,
1996). ProfessorJay Westbrook takes a slightly different approach. He advocates that the
carve out apply only in bankruptcy, but that the changes be made in Article 9. Letter from
Jay L. Westbrook to Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 5, at 1 ("My proposal is that Article 9 itself
should provide for a carve-out in case of an insolvency proceeding, which would normally
be a bankruptcy.").
12 Given the institutional structures by which changes in real and personal property
security laws are made, coordination of a change in the two would be difficult if not impossible. Probably only Congress could implement a carve out applicable to both real and
personal property.
13 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Douglas G.
Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
815 (1987).
14 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984).
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problem.' 5 In particular, there should be only one set of priorities
among creditors, applicable in and out of bankruptcy. 16
Warren began by distinguishing two prototypes of default: "first,
the single default where only one creditor complains about repayment and the remaining creditors are evidently (even if only temporarily) content with their repayment prospects; and second, the
debtor's widespread default and collapse in which every creditor's
prospects for repayment are sharply diminished."1 7 She argued that
the state collection system was designed with only the first type of default in mind; the bankruptcy system, with only the second type of
default in mind.' The bankruptcy system had its own set of priorities,
some of which addressed problems unique to widespread default and
collapse. State collection rules and priorities should not be "accepted
[in bankruptcy] simply because some of the rules make sense in a
different, state law scheme."'19
Baird countered that the state collection system resolved many
situations involving widespread default and collapse. 20 The priority
rules of the state collection system were designed with such situations
in mind. 21 He challenged Warren to explain why the rules she advocated to govern widespread default and collapse in bankruptcy should
22
not also govern widespread default and collapse outside bankruptcy.
15 Baird and Jackson initially argued that rules of nonbankruptcy law should apply in
bankruptcy unless a bankruptcy policy required a different rule. Md.at 100 ("Bankruptcy
law should change a substantive nonbankruptcy rule only when doing so preserves the
value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them."). In the Warren-Baird
debate, Baird modified his position to state merely that rules should be the same in and
out of bankruptcy unless policy requires otherwise. Under Baird's modified position, the
better rule should govern, whether it originates in the bankruptcy system or under
nonbankruptcy law. Baird, supra note 13, at 822 ("Whenever we must have a legal rule to
distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that distributes the same loss
outside of bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate is that these two rules be the same.")
(footnote omitted).
16 See Baird, supra note 13, at 832 ("The idea is... to approximate the same deal that
they had outside of bankruptcy so that no one has an incentive to begin a bankruptcy
proceeding simply because its distributional rule is different.").
17 Warren, supra note 13, at 781.
18 Id. at 782 ("[S]tate collections laws cope with a wide spectrum of limited defaults,
while the bankruptcy scheme concentrates on default in the context of the debtor's imminent collapse. The state collection scheme.., is rationalized in order to serve a wide
variety of collection needs.").
19 Id. at 785.
20 Baird, supra note 13, at 822.
21 See id. ("For better or worse, the drafters of Article 9 knew that their main business
was creating priorities among creditors.").
22 Specifically, Baird challenged:
If Warren thinks nonbankruptcy law's ordering of creditors is inappropriate when a bankruptcy filing has signaled that there is not enough money
to pay all their due, she must explain why she would permit this ordering to
operate in nonbankruptcy disputes even when there is likewise not enough
money to cover all claims.
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In response, Warren acknowledged that "[i] n some cases... state
collection laws will resolve the relative collection rights of parties
when a debtor collapses." 23 But, she then repeated her assertionunchallenged by Baird-that "the state law system is not well-suited to
...[widespread default and collapse] precisely because it necessarily
must consider too broad a range of possible debtor-creditor relationships and follow collection principles inconsistent with those raised in
24
the circumstances of complete collapse."
Both Baird and Warren seemed to recognize the central importance of the legions of debtors collapsing outside bankruptcy. Baird,
sensing the strength of his point that the affairs of many collapsing
debtors never reach bankruptcy and thus are resolved pursuant to
nonbankruptcy law, raises it early, 25 and repeats it often. 26 Warren

seems to regard the problem of widespread default and collapse
outside bankruptcy as merely a glitch in the system-even if an intractable one. To operate effectively, she acknowledges, the system must
distinguish "the context of a single troublesome debt and complete
debtor collapse."

27

Warren did not suggest that the system could, or even should,
force all collapsing debtors into bankruptcy. From a systems standpoint, it would be sufficient if workouts and nonbankruptcy liquidations were negotiated in the shadow of bankruptcy, and therefore on
Id. at 824-25; see also id. at 830-31 (posing hypothetical in which a legislator asks Warren
what priorities retirees should have in bankruptcy, noting that firms with retirees have
closed without a bankruptcy petition being filed, and asking whether Warren would "nevertheless tell the legislator that legislation is needed only for firms that are in bankruptcy").
23 Warren, supra note 13, at 783; see id. at 794 ("Some businesses collapse outside
bankruptcy because information or transaction costs preclude any interested party from
filing.").
24
Id. at 783.
25 Baird, supra note 13, at 816-17 ("As long as many firms close or fail outside of
bankruptcy, treating the question of how to distribute the losses that flow from a business
failure as a bankruptcy question ignores much of the problem and creates perverse
incentives.").
26
E.g., id.at 819 ("Even if bankruptcy's gatekeeping rules were much better than they
are, those who want a special legal regime governing loss distribution when a firm fails or
closes at the same time it defaults to creditors must expect to see in bankruptcy many cases
that do not belong there, and many cases outside bankruptcy that belong in bankruptcy.");
id. at 822 ("A coherent approach to the question of how losses from failed firms should be
distributed cannot ignore the distributional effects many legal rules have on firms that are
not in bankruptcy."); id. at 823 ("In rejecting these nonbankruptcy priorities in bankruptcy, Warren does not follow through and explain why they are appropriate outside
bankruptcy."); id. at 824-25 ("If Warren thinks nonbankruptcy law's ordering of creditors is
inappropriate when a bankruptcy filing has signaled that there is not enough money to pay
all their due, she must explain why she would permit this ordering to operate in nonbankruptcy disputes even when there is likewise not enough money to cover all claims."); id. at
827 ("Workers should not have a different place in line simply because someone has been
able to start a bankruptcy proceeding."); id. at 829-30 ("When Warren focuses on default,
she does not tell us why default policies should exist only in bankruptcy.").
27
Warren, supra note 13, at 795.
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the terms specified in bankruptcy law. But in the absence of bankruptcy, a party can compel settlement on bankruptcy terms only if it
has a cheap, easy, and quick means of forcing the case into bankruptcy should its opponent not agree to settle. The system Warren
envisions still requires an effective bankruptcy triggering mechanism.
Bebchuk and Fried's proposal-echoed by a Greek chorus of Article 9 drafters-that the carve out be effective only in bankruptcy resurrects the issue Baird and Warren debated. Ironically, it is Warren
who now proposes that the new unsecured creditor priority be the
same in and out of bankruptcy and Bebchuk and Fried, employing a
law and economics approach, who would have the existence of the
priority depend on whether there has been a bankruptcy filing. But,
the controlling, and as yet unresolved, issue remains the same. Can
the system effectively separate cases of single troublesome debt and
cases of widespread default and collapse, with the latter, and only the
latter, settled on bankruptcy terms (including the carve out)?
In their article, Bebchuk and Fried were concerned principally
with the economic implications of the existence of substantial numbers of nonadjusting creditors. 28 Their carve out proposal comes near
the end of the article, and they address only briefly their reasons for
concluding that it should apply only in bankruptcy. 29 Regarding the
bankruptcy-only aspect of their proposal, Bebchuk and Fried's principal concern was the same one I present here-whether secured creditors and debtors might be able to evade the bankruptcy-only carve out
by liquidating the collateral outside bankruptcy.3 0
Bebchuk and Fried's method was to hypothesize that a bankruptcy-only carve out proposal had been enacted, and then explore
the strategies that borrowers and their secured creditors would likely
employ in response. 3 1 This Article builds on their strategic analysis to'
assess their implicit conclusion that the strategic effects of a bankruptcy-only carve out are acceptable or controllable. 3 2
Systems/strategic analysis employs a dialectic in which the analyst
begins by describing the operation of the law-related system, with emphasis on how it will process various kinds of cases.3 3 Then the analyst-or someone else 4 --assumes the roles of the various system
-28
29

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 864-67.
Id. at 904-13, 924-26.
30
Id. at 924.
31 Id. at 923-29.
32 Id. at 934.
33
See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479 (1997)
(describing the method for systems/strategic analysis).
34 For example, the Debtor CreditorGame is a computer program that manages a simulation of debtor-creditor interaction. Participants in the simulation, usually law students

enrolled in an advanced bankruptcy course, assume the roles of participants in the system
and try to resolve the financial problems of a hypothetical debtor. See Louis M. Brown,
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participants and attempts to formulate the strategies by which the in3 5 If
dividual participants can best advance their respective interests.
the result of the strategic interaction is inconsistent with the goals of
the system, the analyst proposes modifications to the system to alter
the strategies of participants. The analyst then reassumes the roles of
various participants to test the modified system. Ultimately, a successful analysis will either discover the system form or forms that will
achieve the system's goals, or demonstrate that no such form exists.
Part I of this Article summarizes Bebchuk and Fried's strategic
analysis of their bankruptcy-only carve out proposal. To elaborate on
and test that analysis, Part II describes the state remedies/bankruptcy
system as it currently operates. Part III describes the operational
changes that would occur if the Bebchuk-Fried proposal were adopted
and then analyzes the new system. Part III concludes that either of
two strategies would enable secured creditors to defeat the bankruptcy-only carve out under consideration. The first is a secret liquidation followed by strategic settlements with objecting unsecured
creditors. The second is liquidation by consensual foreclosure, with
the proceeds widely disbursed before the unsecured creditors could
react. Finally, after summarizing the analysis, the Article concludes
that a bankruptcy-only carve out would not change significantly the
asset distributions of collapsing debtors or lending practices.
I
THE

BEBcHUK-FRIED STRATEGic ANALYSIS

For the purpose of their analysis, Bebchuk and Fried divide the
population of failed businesses into two groups: those that eventually
36
enter bankruptcy and those that do not.
A. - Failed Businesses That Enter Bankruptcy
Bebchuk and Fried begin by acknowledging that their bankruptcy-only carve out would give secured creditors an incentive to liquidate before bankruptcy. 37 But they also note that their carve out
will give the debtors and unsecured creditors in the same cases an
equally strong incentive to liquidate in bankruptcy. 38 The strategic
resolution of those incentives, Bebchuk and Fried conclude, will be
Strategiesfor LegalEducation: CreativePresentationsin Bankruptcy, 21 L. & Soc'Y REv. 913, 91617 (1988) (book review) (describing the Debtor Creditor Game).
35 See, e.g., Lisa M. Bossetti & Mette H. Kurth, ProfessorElizabethWarren's U.C.C. Article 9
Carve-Out Proposak A Strategic Analysis, 30 UCC LJ. 1 (1997) (using strategic analysis to
analyze Professor Warren's proposal).
36
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 924-25.
37 Id. at 924.
38
Id. at 925.
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liquidation in bankruptcy. 39 That will occur because secured creditors
can neither seize their collateral nor liquidate their debtors without
their debtors knowing of their attempt "with ample time to file a bankruptcy petition. '40 If the debtor does not file a voluntary bankruptcy
petition before the secured creditor forces a nonbankruptcy liquidation, the unsecured creditors will file an involuntary bankruptcy petition within 90 days after the nonbankruptcy liquidation. The
unsecured creditors will then have the trustee avoid the nonbankruptcy liquidation as a preference and apply the carve out in the
41
ensuing redistribution.
B.

Failed Businesses That Do Not Enter Bankruptcy

Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge that some debtors nevertheless
will manage to liquidate without entering bankruptcy. 42 For the cases
of those debtors, Bebchuk and Fried offer three alternative solutions.
First, they propose "mandatory bankruptcy filing[s]"43 for which the
enforcement mechanism presumably would be criminal. Second,
they assert that under a carve out regime the distributions in nonbankruptcy liquidations will mimic the distribution in bankruptcy liquidations because "unsecured creditors with large enough claims will be
able to threaten credibly to push a liquidating borrower into bankruptcy if they do not receive an amount reflecting what they would
have received" under the carve out.44 Third, the existence of a bankruptcy carve out that might be applied against lenders later will cause
them to lower their loan-to-collateral ratios at the time loans are
made, thereby exerting the desirable influence of the carve out.45
Of course, lenders will have an incentive to respond to the carve
out only to the extent the system can enforce it. Thus Bebchuk and
Fried's last two arguments fail if, in contested cases, the secured creditors can defeat the carve out by irreversibly liquidating their collateral
before bankruptcy. Part III will address whether they can do so. But
before developing those strategies, it is first necessary to describe the
system in which those strategies must operate.

39

Id. at 926.

40

Id. at 925.

41

See id.

42

Id. at 925-26.

43

Id. at 926.
Id.
See id.

44

45
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THE

STATE REMEDIES/BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM

The coercive collection system is widely acknowledged to consist
of two distinct subsystems-the state remedies system and the bankruptcy system. 46 The state remedies system has as its primary purposes
the resolution of disputes regarding the existence and amounts of
debts and forcible debt collection. 4 7 While the bankruptcy system
serves the same purposes (among others),48 it is specifically designed
to do so in the cases of widespread default and collapse. 49 Because
the claims are likely to exceed the value of the assets, and realization
of the maximum value from the assets may require cooperation
among the claimants, the creditors' interests are interdependent. In
recognition of this, bankruptcy procedure-unlike state remedies procedure-requires notice to all creditors and an opportunity for all to
participate.5 0
Despite general efforts to preserve nonbankruiptcy entitlements
in bankruptcy, 5 1 the two subsystems will generate different distributions for a given case.5 2 To illustrate, assume that a debtor with $10 in
assets has unsecured liabilities of $10 to each of 10 different creditors.
If this case is assigned to the bankruptcy system, the creditors will
share pro rata; each will recover $1, which is 10% of the debt owing to
them. If this case is assigned to the state remedies system, the shares
will be determined by a "race of diligence." That is, the debtor can
distribute its own estate through payments or transfers of security until unpaid creditors seize the property. 53 The creditor who acts first
may receive the entire estate.

1 46

See Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory ofthe Dynamics ofthe State Remedies/Bankruptcy

System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 312.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 314-52 (describing the similarity of purpose).
49 See id. at 312.
50 See id. at 343-48.
51 See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are
created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result,
there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.").
52 Law-and-economics scholars seem to accept this point only grudgingly. See, e.g.,
THoMAs H.JACKSON, THE LomC AND LiMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 195-97 (1986) (noting that
the existence of different procedures in and out of bankruptcy invariably changes the relative values of creditors' claims in and out of bankruptcy); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E.
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharingand the Creditors'Bargain,
75 V,. L. REV. 155, 162 (1989) ("Any collectivization procedure necessarily has both a
redistributive and an allocative effect. .. .There will obviously be an interference with

prebankruptcy rights there will also, however, almost inevitably be a change in the relative
value of those prebankruptcy rights.").
53 Preference avoidance is possible under the law of a few states, but, absent bankruptcy, such avoidance is rare. A transfer is not avoidable as fraudulent merely because its
effect is to "prefer" one creditor over another with equal rights. See, e.g., 2 DAVID G. Ep-
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The existence of two subsystems, each specialized to a particular
kind of case, necessitates a mechanism for assigning cases to the appropriate subsystem. The mechanism employed gives each interested
party-management, shareholder, unsecured creditor, and secured
creditor-the ability to move a case into bankruptcy. Management
can do so by filing a voluntary petition; 54 if they do not, their shareholders can replace them with managers who will. 55 Historically, the

principal restraints on voluntary petitions were informal. For nearly
all debtors, the social and economic repercussions of a filing were sufficiently severe that only those in financial distress chose to file. 56 Today, the repercussions remain sufficiently severe that filings by debtors
not in financial distress are rare. 57 In an abundance of caution, some
58
courts infer a requirement that bankruptcy filings be "in good faith,"
thus enabling them to reject filings they consider inappropriate.
Unsecured creditors can move the debtor to bankruptcy by filing
an involuntary petition. 59 The control on involuntary petitions is for§ 6-59, at 99 (1992) (stating that preferences are rarely constructively fraudulent and that the intention to prefer a creditor is not, in itself, actually
fraudulent).
54 In most corporations, the board of directors has the authority to file a bankruptcy
petition. See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANrRuPTCY 74-75
(1996) (discussing authorization of corporate filings).
55
In some close corporations, this will require only a written agreement among shareholders. See id. at 75 n.4. In others, it may be necessary to hold a shareholder meeting to
remove the directors. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.2, at 105 (1986)
("Directors may be removed by shareholders 'for cause' and, if the statute allows, without
cause."). Because of the difficulty of convening a meeting, the shareholders of a large,
publicly held corporation may have no practical way, until annual elections, to override the
board's decision not to file.
56
The repercussions typically included the loss of customers and suppliers, inability
to get credit, damage to reputation, and other kinds of problems. See, e.g., Robert K. RasSTEIN ET AL., BANKRuPTcv

mussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tzx. L. REv. 51, 88

(1992) (lost business opportunities and customers); MarkJ. Roe, The Voting Prohibitionin
Bond Workouts, 97 YALE LJ. 232, 273 (1987) (speculating on loss of suppliers, customers,
and managers).
57
For several years, commentators used the Manville case as an example of a debtor
filing bankruptcy strategically, even though it was not in financial distress. See In reJohnsManville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a debtor need not
be insolvent to file under Chapter 11). The characterization of Manville as solvent was
wrong from the start, and was proven so as the volume of asbestos litigation increased and
Manville's financial condition deteriorated. The magnitude of the error is captured in the
incongruous facts that Manville's commercial creditors were paid in full with interest, and
Manville's equity holders recovered $132.9 million in the bankruptcy, see Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of

Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 166-67 tbl.IV(A) (1990), yet
Manville's asbestos claims-whose priority rights were equal to the commercial creditors
and superior to the equity holders-are now being paid at a rate of only 10 cents on the
dollar, see Louis Sahagun, Dow Corning's Bankruptcy Filing- Asbestos Firm Took the Same Path,

L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at D13 (noting that "the best the [asbestos] victims can now
expect is 10 cents on the dollar").
58
59

See, e.g., Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 737.

See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994).
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mal. Unless the petitioners can show that the debtor "is generally not
paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due," the bankruptcy
court will dismiss the petition and assess costs and attorneys' fees
60
against the petitioners.
Although secured creditors have no direct means of moving their
debtor into bankruptcy, they do have adequate indirect means. Their
contracts generally give them the right to declare a default on the
basis of virtually any symptom of financial distress.6 ' Personal property secured creditors usually can obtain a writ of replevin within days
of the default, giving them the immediate right to have a sheriff seize
the collateral. 62 The threat of a levy generally leaves the debtor with
no practical alternative but to file for bankruptcy. Real property secured creditors often can obtain the appointment of a receiver within
a short time after filing a complaint for foreclosure, giving many of
them a similar, but somewhat less effective, method of forcing a
63
bankruptcy.
Though nearly any interested party can force bankruptcy in an
appropriate case, that alone does not assure a bankruptcy distribution. The debtor might be able to liquidate its assets under nonbankruptcy law before the petition is filed, or some creditor might be able
to force such an eve-of-bankruptcy liquidation. The system's solution
to this threat is to authorize the post-filing avoidance of preferential
transfers to creditors that occurred within the ninety-day period
before filing.64 By recovering assets transferred to creditors in the
ninety days before bankruptcy and redistributing them according to
bankruptcy rules, the system extends the distributional scheme of
bankruptcy ninety days into the prebankruptcy past. But, in order to
grasp the full importance of the preference rule to the system's intentions, one must consider the strategic implication. Preference law is
not designed merely to extend the bankruptcy distribution rules into
the past; it is designed to prevent nonbankruptcy distribution by any
debtor in financial distress. The concept is that if a debtor made or
suffered such a distribution, any party disadvantaged by it would force
a bankruptcy filing within ninety days and reverse it. Thus, effective
60 Id. § 303(h) (1). If the case is filed in bad faith, the award can include damages
(including punitive damages). See id. § 303(i) (2).
61
See LYNN M. LoPuc~i & EuZABErH WARREN, SECURED CREDrr: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
255-57 (1995) (describing typical default provisions).
62 See, e.g., Del's Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1071
(W.D. Wis. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding issuance of a writ of
replevin without notice to the debtor on the day the case was filed, resulting in the same
day seizure of the debtor's business).
63
See I GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.34 (3d

ed. 1993) (discussing the basis for appointing a receiver).
64
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). If the transfer is to an insider, the period is one year.
See id.
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procedures for petitioning debtors into bankruptcy, together with a
functioning preference scheme, could separate cases of a single troub65
lesome debt from cases of widespread default and collapse.
However, the current preference scheme is a failure. Involuntary
bankruptcy petitions are filed in cases where exceptionally large
amounts of money are at stake, 66 but are rarely filed in ordinary
cases. 6 7 Debtors liquidate their own estates or grant security interests
to favored creditors, without the filing of bankruptcy cases within the
applicable preference periods. Even when Chapter 11 cases are filed
within the preference periods, preferential transfers typically are not
avoided. 68 By and large, debtors in widespread default and collapse
still manage to control distributions of their estates. 69 The words I
70
wrote in 1982 remain true today:
The bankruptcy court deals not with businesses in financial difficulty, but with their skeletons, already picked clean by workouts,
65 1 assume here that a debtor in a state of widespread default and collapse will fail to
pay its debts as they become due. Where such debtors do generally pay their debts as they
become due, unsecured creditors may have no means of forcing them into bankruptcy.
66
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 756 n.277 (1993)
(noting that out of 43 Chapter 11 cases of large, publicly held companies, 6 (14%) were
involuntary).
67 The percentage of involuntary petitions declines with the size of the case, demonstrating its sensitivity to the deterrent effects of transaction costs. See LoPucki, supra note
46, at 363 n.257 (rates for 1977, 1979, and 1980 were about one-half of one percent of
bankruptcy filings); Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing
US and Canadian Reorganization of FinanciallyDistressed Companies, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw 109, 121 n.34 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) [hereinafter CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS] (noting that for the twelve
month period endingJune 30, 1988, 260 out of 18,629 Chapter 11 cases (1.4%) were involI
untary filings).
68 SeeJerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Casefor Adoption of the Trustee
System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 196-97 (1987) (presenting empirical data on Chapter 11
cases in the Eastern District of Wisconsin demonstrating that preference avoidance is rare).
69
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 223, 226 (1991) ("In most [Chapter 7 liquidation] cases, the firm has no unencumbered assets. The purpose is not so much to give creditors assets as it is to assure them that
no assets are there."); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution,26 GA. L. REV. 27, 57 (1991)
("The empirical evidence is that few distributions occur in bankruptcies. Thus, if bankruptcy is intended as a device for redistributing wealth from rich to poor creditors, it has
been stunningly unsuccessful.").
70
In 1977, the percentage of bankruptcy liquidations in which there was a distribution to general creditors was only 13.3%. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 8-9 (1978) (discussing "asset cases" in a manner showing
that they include distributions to unsecured creditors and indicating that 30,850 of the
231,509 cases closed in 1977 (13.3%) were asset cases). By 1991-92 it had sunk to five
percent. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIPTS PAID
TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 1-2 (1994); Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti,
Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distributionof Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 311 (1988) (finding that 4.25% of
Chapter 7 cases during the study period resulted in distributions to unsecured creditors).
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state court proceedings, informal liquidations, or merely the ravages
of time and poor management. "Bankruptcy," as that term is used
71
in economic theory, does not take place in the bankruptcy courts.
Even without the additional stress of a bankruptcy-only carve out, the
system has been "stunningly unsuccessful" in invoking the bankruptcy
72
rules for the liquidation of collapsing debtors.
III
THE BEBCHUK-FRIED CARVE OUT PROPOSAL

A.

Proposed Changes in the System

Bebchuk and Fried directed their attention principally to matters
of economic theory. As a result, the specifics of their carve out proposal are not developed fully. To describe their proposal in systems
terms requires that I make assumptions as to how they would have
resolved various implementation issues. I do so because specifics are
necessary to render the proposed system sufficiently concrete for systems/strategic analysis. The reader should keep in mind that
Bebchuk and Fried might resolve some of these issues differently, ultimately leading to different conclusions.
As one of two alternatives, Bebchuk and Fried propose that in
bankruptcy cases, 7 3 secured creditors should recover only the amount
of their secured debt or 75% of the value of the collateral, whichever
is less. 74 They contemplate that the proposal would apply in Chapter
7 and Chapter 11,7 5 but only with regard to "commercial borrowers." 76 The proposal will increase the incentives for secured creditors
to liquidate their debtors outside bankruptcy, but it also will increase
the incentives for unsecured creditors to liquidate their debtors in
bankruptcy. Thus, it is not obvious that the carve out will make the
system more or less effective in triggering bankruptcy.
Though Bebchuk and Fried never say so directly, they apparently
contemplate that the carve out will be applied as of the date of the
bankruptcy filing, and that after filing, the carved out creditors will be
LoPucki, supranote 46, at 312.
72 Bowers, supra note 69, at 57.
73 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 904 ("[T]he operation of security interests
outside bankruptcy would be completely unaffected by [the carve out].").
74 Id. at 909-11 (discussing the "fixed-fraction priority rule" and using 75% as an
example).
75 Id. at 911-13 (arguing that the carve out will not be a sharp break from current
practice because the existing regime erodes priority in cases under Chapter 11); see also id.
at 928 (arguing that the incentive to substitute leases for security interests in a carve out
regime will be moderate because leases are eroded under Chapter 11 as it currently
operates).
76 Id. at 934; see, e.g., id. at 904 n.158 (stating that the carve out proposals are not
"intended for use in consumer bankruptcy cases where the individual wvas not engaged in a
business before going bankrupt").
71
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able to accrue interest and attorneys' fees on the secured portions of
their claims. 77 Thus, if a debtor filed under Chapter 11 owing its secured creditor $100 secured by an asset worth $100, the creditor initially would have a secured claim in the amount of $75 and an
unsecured claim in the amount of $25.78 The creditor then would be
entitled to accrue interest and attorneys' fees on the secured portion
of its claim, because after applying the carve out, the claim would be
"secured by property the value of which... is greater than the amount
of such [secured] claim. '79 If, for example, interest accrued at 12%
per year for the duration of a two-and-one-half year Chapter 11 case,
the secured creditor would have a secured claim of $97.5080 and an
unsecured claim of $25. Such a creditor might be better off in the
carve out regime than under current law where the creditor would
have only a secured claim of $100.81 Permitting the accrual of interest
and attorneys' fees after application of the carve out would moderate
the overall effect of the carve out, but probably not to any great degree in cases under Chapter 7, which conclude more quickly than
those under Chapter 11.
Bebchuk and Fried are correct in their choice of rules regarding
the accrual of interest and attorneys' fees on a carved secured claim.
To understand why, assume that the opposite rule has been adopted:
during a bankruptcy case, secured creditors may accrue interest and
attorneys' fees only to the extent of 75% of the value of the collateral.
The pattern of lending that would best exploit such a rule is the pattern that I call "segmented" lending.8 2 As applied here, the strategy
would direct that instead of borrowing under a single mortgage, the
77 Id. at 911-13 (discussing the erosion of secured claims that currently occurs in cases
under Chapter 11, in part because undersecured creditors are not permitted to accrue
interest and attorneys's fees on their claims). If secured creditors were not permitted to
accrue interest and attorneys' fees on their claims after application of the carve out, the
erosion of the carve out would be added to the existing erosion. That is, the secured
creditor would lose the 25% carve out and the time value of the remaining 75% of its

claim. Bebchuk and Fried seem to contemplate that the carve out will be a substitute
erosion, rather than an added erosion. Id. at 911 ("[The carve out] rule would certainly be
preferable to the currently prevailing de facto rule of partial priority."); see also id. at 871-72
(asserting that the carve out would not effect a radical change because the system is already
one of partial-priority).
78 See id. at 910 (giving a similar example).
79 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
80 The interest would be: $75 x .12 x 2.5 = $22.50, making the principal and interest:
$75 + $22.50 = $97.50.

81 Thus interpreted, the carve out would have the positive effect of reducing the
debtor's incentive to delay in Chapter 11 in order to enjoy the benefits of an interest-free
loan from its undersecured creditors. Because of the carve out, the debtor would have no
undersecured creditors for several years into the bankruptcy case. Obviously, in a long
case, interest accruing to the secured creditors could consume the carve out, leaving nothing for unsecured creditors.
82

LYNN M. LoPucKi, STRATEGIES FOR

(3d ed. 1997).

CREDITORS IN

BANKRuPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 3.05(J)
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debtor should borrow from two creditors on first and second mortgages.8 3 The first mortgage would be for approximately 60% of the
liquidation value of the collateral; the second mortgage, for the remaining 40%.84 Through this strategy, the debtor, along with the secured creditors as a group, would gain two advantages. First, in any
ensuing bankruptcy, the first mortgage would be oversecured, so that
interest and attorneys' fees would accrue on it after application of the
carve out.85 By contrast, if the secured lending had been from a single
mortgagee for 100% of the liquidation value of the collateral, no interest or attorneys' fees would have accrued.8 6 Thus, lenders using
the system-unintended, segmented lending strategy would largely defeat the carve out, while those not using the strategy would suffer the
carve out. The carve out would cause strategic activity without affect87
ing outcomes substantially.
The second advantage gained by the alliance of debtor and secured lenders through loan segmentation would be that second secured lenders could specialize in liquidating debtors outside
bankruptcy to defeat the carve out. The second secured lenders
would be motivated by the fact that, outside bankruptcy, they would
have priority over the unsecured creditors, although, in bankruptcy,
they would share pro rata with the unsecured creditors. The segmented lending this pattern of incentives generates would push debtors in the direction of nonbankruptcy liquidation, thus rendering the
carve out less effective.
88
Regardless of the effect of the carve out on lending practices, one should not expect the last 25% of collateral value to arrive at bankruptcy unencumbered. Having a
security interest against the last 25% of any item of collateral will carry with it some rights
and therefore will have some value; certainly, some creditors will bid for it, thus encumbering
it.
84 The secured creditor need not estimate the liquidation value of the collateral to
gain the benefit, or even the full benefit, of this strategy. Any loan segment that is less than
the value that the bankruptcy court assigns to the collateral will accrue interest during
bankruptcy. By dividing the loan into a near infinite number of segments, the secured
creditors could assure that interest will accrue on the entire secured portion, regardless of
the value the court assigns. For example, assume that a $100,000 loan were divided into
100,000 segments, each in the amount of $1. If the court determined that the value of the
collateral was $67,000, the first 66,999 loans would be oversecured and the holders of each
would be entitled to accrue interest. Only the 67,000th loan would be affected by the
Supreme Court's decision in United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365
(1988). Had the loan instead been a single segment of $100,000, under Timbers, no portion of the loan would accrue interest.
85
That is, the secured claim would be 60% of the value of the collateral, so it would
accrue interest until it reached 75%.
86
This assumes that the single secured loan would have been in an amount in excess
of 75% of the collateral's value. Were it not, a second mortgage loan would be necessary to
capture the collateral's full value in quick liquidations under Chapter 7.
87 The argument presented here favors the accrual of interest on secured claims not
only after carve out, but also under current law. See LoPucu, supra note 82, § 3.05(J).
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Bebchuk and Fried make clear their intention that the carve out
be enforced retroactively for ninety days through preference law. 88
Because the carve out will create a new class of avoidable preferenceliquidation of collateral within the preference period-and the transactions often will be in substantial amounts, one effect probably will
be to increase the dollar amounts that trustees and debtors-in-possession must recover as preferences. In turn, the increase in dollar
amounts will make it somewhat more difficult for the trustees or debtors-in-possession to collect their judgments of avoidance. 89
In their initial article, Bebchuk and Fried did not consider
whether purchasers at foreclosure sales should be liable for the preferences that the sales effect. Part III.B.3 considers that issue.
B.

Strategic Analysis

The system, as modified in Part III.A, would be vulnerable to two
strategies that the system could not counter. The first is a secret voluntary liquidation of collateral outside bankruptcy for the benefit of
secured creditors, shielded by strategic settlements with unsecured
creditors who discover the liquidation in time to challenge it. The
second is the use of judgment-proof entities to receive and disburse
widely the proceeds of liquidations that occur on the eve of
bankruptcy.
1.

The Secret Voluntary Liquidation Strategy

In their strategic analysis, Bebchuk and Fried assume that debtors
would oppose secured creditors' efforts to liquidate collateral outside
bankruptcy. 90 Their assumption ignores the possibility that in a carve
out regime, the interests of collapsing debtors may coincide with the
interests of their secured creditors in achieving a nonbankruptcy liquidation. The coincidence would result from contractual obligations incurred at the time of making the secured loans. At that time, the
interests of debtors and their secured creditors regarding possible liquidation would coincide. The debtor would prefer to bind itself to a
nonbankruptcy liquidation because that would increase the value of
the collateral to the secured creditor and thus enable the debtor to
obtain better terms. There might be some tendency for the debtor to
suffer correspondingly worse terms in obtaining unsecured credit, but
88 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 925 (arguing that unsecured creditors would
make the carve out effective by filing involuntary petitions).
89 A trustee or debtor-in-possession attempting to recover a preference usually sues as
an unsecured creditor. Yet many of the creditors from whom they must recover the payments are judgment proof. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L-J. 1, 1438 (1996) (describing the techniques for defeating recovery by unsecured creditors).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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this tendency will not offset the advantage gained with secured
creditors.9 1
Means for debtors to bind themselves to nonbankruptcy liquidations are readily available. For example, a debtor's shareholders
might personally guarantee the debt to a secured creditor without
guaranteeing the debts to nonadjusting unsecured creditors.
Whether or not the creditor actually could collect from the shareholders on the guarantee, the guarantee would tend to cause the interests
of the shareholders and the secured creditor to coincide at liquidation. Both would want the secured creditor paid in preference to the
unsecured creditors. 92 In recent years, innovative strategists have
been experimenting with other ways of "bankruptcy-proofing" companies. 93 The primary limitation on bankruptcy-proofing has not been
the inability to do it, but the lack of demand for it. One could expect
that to change if 25% of the secured creditor's collateral were at stake.
If a business is worth more in operation, the debtor and its secured creditor will share an interest in keeping it that way. But liquidation of the collateralis not inconsistent with the continued operation
of the business. Liquidation of the collateral can be merely a paper
transaction. The secured creditor might sell the assets in place, buy
them at the sale, 94 and lease them to the debtor-or employ some
transactional equivalent.
The nonadjusting unsecured creditors, as a group, would have
precisely the opposite interests; they would gain most by forcing the
debtor to liquidate in bankruptcy. The most direct means for accomplishing that would be for three or more unsecured creditors to file

91

See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 882-91 (noting the existence of many un-

secured creditors who will not adjust the terms on which they will lend); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1896-98, 1916-20 (1994) (noting the
existence of substantial numbers of unsecured creditors who have neither the opportunity
nor the information necessary to adjust to the terms on which their debtors obtain secured
credit).
92 Although the secured creditor could not collect on the guarantee, it could use the
guarantee to force the shareholders into bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994) (stating that an involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapters 7 or 11).
93 Examples include: (1) security interests in the owners' shareholdings that will enable the secured creditor to seize control of the company if the company suffers financial
distress; (2) loan covenants by which creditors can assume voting control of the company
directly if it suffers financial distress; and (3) covenants enabling the creditors to assume
seats on the board of directors if the company suffers financial distress. See generally
LoPucri, supra note 82, § 3.08 (elaborating on examples).

94 Alternatively, the secured creditor might arrange for a third party to buy them,
depending on whether buyers at foreclosure sales are vulnerable to preference avoidance.
See infra text accompanying notes 26-29. Under UCC § 9-504, the sale must be commercially reasonable, but that does not mean the sale cannot be "private." U.C.C. § 9-504(3)

(1995).
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an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor. 95 However, un96
secured creditors file relatively few involuntary bankruptcy petitions.
In part, the low filing rate results from procedures that are deliberately hostile to involuntary filers. 97 For example, petitioning creditors
typically have no reliable means of obtaining the information they
need to determine the appropriateness of their petition in advance.
In most cases, they must take a shot in the dark. 98 Yet Bankruptcy
Rule 9011 requires that either the petitioners or their attorney certify
that "to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the petition] is well
grounded in fact."99 If their petition fails, petitioning creditors may
be liable for the debtor's attorneys' fees and costs, and may even be
liable for the debtor's actual damages from the filing or punitive damages. 10 0 If their petition succeeds, the petitioning creditors reap no
reward for joining the petition; they share pro rata with those unsecured creditors who did not join the petition. They have a claim
against the debtor's estate for their own attorneys' fees, but that claim
is subordinate to the claims of secured creditors and must share pro
rata with other expenses of administration. 10 1
Bebchuk and Fried correctly point out that a bankruptcy-only
carve out will, in some respects, enhance the incentives of unsecured
creditors to file involuntary petitions.' 0 2 In the event of a successful
95 Alternatively, the unsecured creditor might force the debtor into bankruptcy by
obtaining a writ of execution and threatening to seize critical assets. Strategists, however,
have developed techniques that have reduced the effectiveness of this alternative. See Lynn
M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawoyer's Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
1498, 1537-41 (1996) (describing strategy by which a cooperating secured creditor can
block execution).
96 See supra notes 66-67.
97 For a brief description of the historical roots of the hostility, see Judge Friendly's
dissent to In re GibraltorAmusements, Ltd., 291 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1961). Among other
things, Friendly cites the statement of Martin Van Buren, denouncing an attempt to provide for voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy in a single statute: "'It is an erroneous
idea.., that this bill can be made to serve God and mammon by combining two things
totally at variance.'" Id. at 27 n.2 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
3 CONG. DEB. 279 (1829)).
See ELiZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
98
CREDITORS 464-65 (3d ed. 1996) (raising, in problem 27.1, the issue of how creditors can
obtain the information necessary to file an involuntary case); ELrzABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE W-smRooI, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS: TEACHER'S MANUAL 158 (3d

ed. 1996) (commenting that "[W] e want the students to see how very difficult it can be for
a creditor to learn enough information about the debtor to permit a prudent decision
about an involuntary filing even when the debtor hasn't paid our creditor and the debtor is
rumored to be in serious trouble").
99 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(a).
See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1994).
100
101
See id. § 503(b) (3)-(4) (providing for allowance of the attorneys' fees and costs of
involuntary petitioners).
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 925.
102
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petition, at least 25% of the value of the secured creditors' collateral
would be available for the payment of expenses of administration,
other priority debts, and unsecured creditors. Thus, for example, the
attorneys' fees and other out-of-pocket expenses of successful petitioning creditors almost certainly would be paid. 10 3 It might appear that
the most profitable course of action open'to an unsecured creditor
who discovers that its debtor has surrendered collateral to a secured
creditor would be to enlist two other unsecured creditors, file an involuntary petition, and secure the appointment or election of a
trustee who will avoid the transfer.
However, in most cases, that preference avoidance strategy will be
less appealing than a strategy that defeats the carve out and enables
the would-be petitioning creditors to share in the nonbankruptcy liquidation. First, it is not clear that the preference avoidance strategy
will result in significant distributions to unsecured creditors. Freed
from the hold of its secured creditor by the involuntary petition, the
debtor is likely to attempt a reorganization. The carve out would assure that the funding for a reorganization would be available in every
case-that is one of the justifications for adopting the carve out in the
first place. A debtor has the right to attempt a reorganization' 0 4 and
little to lose by trying; typically, neither the debtor nor its owners will
recover anything in a liquidation. 10 5 The distribution that the secured
creditor would get in liquidation might be at risk in reorganization,
but if the secured creditor still has leverage with the debtor, it can use
that leverage to obtain favoritism under the reorganization plan. 0 6 If
the debtor fails in an attempt at reorganization, the failure is likely to
consume the bulk of the funds that the carve out made available to
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)-(4) (making the attorneys' fees and costs of successful
petitioning creditors expenses of administration).
104
See id. § 706(a) ("The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under
chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this tide at any time, if the case has not been converted [to Chapter
7] under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this tide.").
105 See supra note 70.
106 In practice, debtors seldom sue to avoid preferences in cases under Chapter 11. See
Kerkman, supra note 68, at 196-97. Instead, they use the threat of such avoidance to secure
support for their plans. See LoPucu, supra note 82, §§ 10.03[F], 11.03[H]. That strategy
generally is acceptable to the bankruptcy courts, so long as the courts perceive that the
debtor is using the leverage to benefit the estate rather than the insiders. See, e.g., Harstad
v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating in dicta that the debtor would
not have been able to avoid a preference because the power of avoidance was for the
benefit of only the estate and the debtor did not show how its recovery would have benefitted anyone other than the debtor). When'a debtor uses the leverage to benefit the insiders, many bankruptcy courts permit the unsiecured creditors' committee to prosecute the
preference actions on the estate's behalf. See, e.g., In re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 91
B.R. 655, 656-57 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("If... a trustee/debtor-in-possession unjustifiably
fails
to employ its statutory arsenal of avoiding powers or otherwise abuses its discretion in
not suing, a creditors' conunittee has implied authority to bring an action on behalf of the
estate in bankruptcy with the approval of the bankruptcy court.") (footnote omitted).
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the estate.' 0 7 Even if the debtor does not attempt reorganization, the
expenses of administration, together with tax and other priority
claims, are likely to consume the bulk of the carve out funds,

°8

leav-

ing relatively little for distribution to unsecured creditors, including
petitioning unsecured creditors.
The better strategy for the unsecured creditor that discovers an
avoidable surrender of collateral would be to bargain with the debtor
and the secured creditor to join their alliance. Elsewhere, I have explored in detail the forms such a settlement might take. 10 9 The most
efficient form is for the preferred creditor to assign to the complaining creditor the same percentage of the preferential transfer that
the complaining creditor holds of the unsecured claims against the
debtor. 110 To continue with the previous example, assume that in a
carve out regime the holder of a $25,000 unsecured claim discovers
that Debtor surrendered $1 million in collateral to Secured Creditor,
effecting a preference to Secured Creditor in the amount of $250,000.
Assume further that potential unsecured claims total $500,000, so that
avoidance of the preference would result in a dividend to unsecured
creditors of fifty cents on the dollar, less the expenses of administration, priority claims, and reorganization losses."' That is, in bankruptcy the complaining creditor would get $12,500, less its pro rata
share of the expenses of administration, priority claims, and reorganization losses. Both Secured Creditor and the complaining creditor
will fare better in a settlement in which Secured Creditor assigns to
the complaining creditor a 5% interest in the $250,000 transfer Secured Creditor received. The assignment might be made pursuant to
an agreement not to disclose the assignment or encourage the filing
of a bankruptcy case while the surrender of collateral remains avoidable as a preference, but no agreement on the part of the complaining
creditor is needed. Once the assignment is made, the recipient of the
surrender and the complaining creditor share a common interest in
107 See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at ProfessionalFees and OtherDirectCosts in
Small FirmBankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847, 868 (finding that "total chapter 11 direct
costs averaged 21.55% of all unencumbered and encumbered assets reported in the petidon and 14.49% of disbursements to all creditors").
1o8 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 726(a) (1994) (specifying the classes of unsecured claims
that have priority over general unsecured creditors).
109
LoPucu, supra note 82, § 2.16[D].
110 See id.
111
Reorganization gains would be possible, but given the high rate of business failure
during Chapter 11 and the strategies available to debtors for assuring that unsecured creditors do not capture the lion's share of the gains, losses are probably considerably more
likely. See Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 CaseManagement and Delay Reduction: An Empirical
Study, 4 AM. BANtR. INsT. L. REv. 85, 87-89 (1996) (collecting studies showing the confirmation rates in ordinary Chapter 11 cases to be between 17% and 44%); id.at 112-13 (reporting confirmation rates of 16.1% and 16.8% under a "fast track" case management system
adopted by Judge Geraldine Mund in Los Angeles).
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having the preference period expire without further incident. The
filing of a bankruptcy, followed by avoidance-of the surrender as a
preference, will render the assignment worthless as well. Thus, if no
bankruptcy is filed and the transfer is not avoided, the complaining
creditor will recover $12,500. If the transfer is avoided, the complaining creditor will recover only $12,500, less the expenses of administration, priority claims, and reorganization losses. If other
unsecured creditors complain of the preference, Secured Creditor
can settle with them in the same manner. Secured Creditor's benefit
from the preference will be reduced, but Secured Creditor will remain
better off than if Debtor went into bankruptcy and the preference
were avoided. The only exception would occur in the unlikely event
that every unsecured creditor complains. I have successfully employed
this settlement technique in practice.
This settlement technique works because, in the absence of bankruptcy, unsecured creditors usually have a severe collective action
problem. That is, it ordinarily would be in the interests of unsecured
creditors as a group to monitor Debtor, discover the grant of the preference, and force Secured Creditor to disgorge it. But it rarely would
be in the interests of each unsecured creditor to do so. Preserving the
preference enables the monitoring creditors, Debtor, and Secured
Creditor to capture and divide among themselves the share that the
nonmonitoring unsecured creditors would get in bankruptcy. To generalize further, whenever the system permits contracting parties to
capture and divide between them value that, absent the contract,
would have gone to someone else, the parties will tend to make the
contract. 112 The effect here is to permit only complaining unsecured
113
creditors to benefit from a bankruptcy-only carve out.

2.

System Response to the Voluntary Liquidation Strategy

Under the current rules for triggering bankruptcy, debtors and
their secured creditors could easily defeat a bankruptcy-only carve out
through prebankruptcy liquidation. But the issue identified in the
Warren-Baird debate remains-whether better triggering rules might
yield better results. Three such rules have been proposed.

112 Secured credit is another example of such a deal. See LoPucki, supra note 91, at
1899 ("Security is an agreement between A and B that C take nothing.").
113
Some of the means suggested here could avoid a carve out applicable inside and
outside bankruptcy. That is, insiders could settle on non-carve out terms and share their
advantage only with unsecured creditors who complain. But a universal carve out would be
less vulnerable to these strategies because it is so much easier for general creditors to initiate a lawsuit than an involuntary bankruptcy.
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a. LoPucki: Bounty for Unsecured Creditors
In 1982, I proposed that the claims of successful petitioning creditors whose debts were not consumer debts should receive priority
over the claims of general creditors in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.' 14 The grounds for such a petition-that the debtor was
generally not paying its debts as they became due-would remain unchanged. I continue to believe that the proposal would have a positive
effect on the operation of the state remedies/bankruptcy system by
channeling the cases of financially distressed debtors into bankruptcy
at earlier stages.
That proposal, however, might not be adequate to solve the even
greater challenge a bankruptcy-only carve out poses. To bring debtors
who were generally not paying into bankruptcy earlier would not be
sufficient; it would be necessary to bring them into bankruptcy before
they could effect an irreversible nonbankruptcy liquidation. Such a
liquidation might occur before the petitioning creditors were even eligible to file-while the debtor was still generally paying. Moreover,
the proposal would do nothing to solve the petitioning creditors'
greatest problem-obtaining the information necessary to determine
when an involuntary petition is necessary and appropriate.
b. Jackson: Bounty for Debtors
In 1986, Professor Thomas H. Jackson noted the incentives for
shareholders of a firm "to delay too long in filing a bankruptcy petition." 115 He explored briefly the possibility of offering "a bounty
based on the extra value gained by resorting to the bankruptcy" to
shareholders-as "the group that is most likely to learn first about
debtor's insolvency"-to commence a bankruptcy case instead of to
delay."l 6 In a later article, Baird suggested that "[tihe weakness of
giving a cash bounty to the managers... may lie in the inability of the
court to determine after the fact when the bankruptcy petition should
have been brought and how much difference bringing the proceeding
at the right time makes." 117
Baird may have overstated his case. The court's determination
will be only an approximation, but knowledge that the court will make
such a good faith approximation may be sufficient to establish appropriate incentives for debtors to file.
The real problem with the proposal of a bounty for debtors is that
this proposal seeks to solve a problem by rewarding the persons who
114
115
116
117

LoPucki, supra note 46, at 365-68.
JACKSON, supra note 52, at 205.
Id. at 206-08.
Baird, supra note 69, at 231.
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cause the problem in the first place. The bankruptcy bounty would be
somewhat analogous to payments to criminally minded people not to
commit theft. If the payments were large enough, theft might slow,
but the cost would be substantial, and it would continue to grow as
more people found it profitable to become criminally minded and
thereby eligible to share in the bounty.
To illustrate the problem with respect to the carve out, assume
that Debtor has assets of $100 that are collateral for a debt in the same
amount. Further assume that Debtor and Secured Creditor plan a
nonbankruptcy liquidation in which the owner-managers will be released from $12.50 in guarantee liability that they would otherwise
have to pay. The bankruptcy system might be able to capture the case
by paying a bounty of $13 to the owner-managers, but that would be
an expensive route to take. Unsure of which debtors were capable of
strategic combination with their secured creditors, the system would
have to pay the bounty to all debtors. The secured creditors, who
would benefit at any price less than the $25 carve out they would face
in bankruptcy (plus appropriate allowance for transaction costs and
risk premium), might even be able to outbid the court that offered
$13.
c.

Bebchuk and Fried: Mandatory Bankruptcy Filing

In 1996, Bebchuk and Fried raised the possibility of requiring
that every liquidating firm with unpaid debt file a statement with the
bankruptcy court listing its assets, transfers made during the preceding year, and the identities of all of its unpaid creditors. 1 8 A courtappointed representative of the unsecured creditors or some other
party could then supervise the allocation of the debtor's assets so that
it conformed with the carve out. 1 9 Such a rule would eliminate com120
pletely any problem that out-of-bankruptcy liquidations would pose.
The proceeding they proposed would not be markedly different
from a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. That is, for a
corporate debtor, Chapter 7 involves no issues of discharge or retention of property. The focus of a corporate Chapter 7 case under current law is the same as the focus of the proposed proceedingliquidating and distributing the estate. What Bebchuk and Fried proposed, in essence, is that all debtors in complete collapse face a requirement to liquidate in bankruptcy. Bebchuk and Fried did not
explain how they would enforce their filing requirement. Presumably,
however, they would attach some penalty to failure to file when the
case is appropriate for bankruptcy.
118

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 926.

119
120

I&

Id.
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To implement their proposal, the system would have to identify,
with specificity adequate for criminal enforcement, the circumstances
triggering the duty to file. But, that may be possible. The system
might require that any debtor that seeks to liquidate an asset of a specified value file a bankruptcy case when the debtor's remaining assets
would be insufficient to satisfy its debts. 121 Given the draconian consequences that a bankruptcy filing would have for the debtor-secured
creditor alliance, violations of the law would be common unless enforcement were vigorous. The British system makes directors and officers personally liable for continuing the operations of an insolvent
company outside bankruptcy, 122 but the law does not appear to be
23
very effective.'
The greatest obstacle to each of these three proposals is the abiding American prejudice in favor of negotiated, out-of-court solutions. 124 Any scheme that made it possible to bring financiallydistressed debtors into bankruptcy cheaply, easily, and quickly would
reduce the number of out-of-court workouts drastically. More financially distressed debtors would be subject to the "stigma" of
1 25
bankruptcy.
I do not share the prejudice in favor of out-of-court workouts.
Negotiations are more, rather than less successful when they occur on
a conveyor belt moving toward adjudication, and it is particularly so in
complex, multiparty litigation such as bankruptcy. 126 If information
about debtors were readily available in manageable forms, the
"stigma" of bankruptcy would be neither more nor less than it should
This standard is similar to the standard for the payment of dividends by a corpora121
don. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.33(C) (Anderson Supp. 1996) ("No dividend... shall be paid to the holders of shares of any class... when the corporation is
insolvent or there is reasonable ground to believe that by such payment it would be rendered insolvent."). Another alternative would be the British standard for imposing personal liability on directors for wrongful trading "[when] there was no reasonable prospect
that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation." Insolvency Act, 1986, ch.
45, § 214(1) (Eng.).
122
See L. S. Sealy, PersonalLiability of Directorsand Officers for Debts of Insolvent Corporations: A JurisdictionalPerspective (England),in CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 67, at 485,
491-94.
123
See id. at 494-95.
See Walter 0. Weyrauch, American Law as a BargainingSystem, FLA. IAw., Fall 1989, at
124
14, 14-15 (describing the overwhelming preference for bargained solutions in the American system and contrasting it with continental systems).
125
The bankruptcy literature is replete with schemes to achieve the benefits of bankruptcy without its stigma. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 95, at 1539-41 (describing strategy
attorney Lincoln Brooks invented to achieve the effect of a bankruptcy stay against dissenting unsecured creditors without filing a bankruptcy case); Richard E. Mendales, We Can
Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1211, 1301-04 (1994) (proposing a new, nonbankruptcy procedure called
a "securities restructuring" that would substitute for prepackaged Chapter 11 cases).
126
See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 57, at 143-49 (showing prejudice of reorganization lawyers against adjudicated solutions to be empirically unwarranted).
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be. Rather than tout the cost savings of avoiding bankruptcy, we
should reduce the costs of bankruptcy. But these are not ideas that
are going to be adopted any time soon-and certainly not merely to
limit the carve out to bankruptcy.
3.

The Judgment-ProofTransferee Strategy

Assume that after enactment of the carve out, Secured Creditor
forecloses on property of Debtor, which is sold to Buyer at a sheriff's
sale for $1 million. The sheriff pays the sale proceeds to Secured
Creditor. Unsecured creditors petition Debtor into bankruptcy less
than ninety days after the sale, and Trustee sues Buyer, not Secured
Creditor, to recover the $250,000 preference.
127
Should the preference law be drafted to permit the action?
The courts recently faced a closely analogous issue with regard to actions by trustees to set aside prebankruptcy foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers. In resolving a long-standing split among the circuits,
the Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.128 held that trustees
should not be able to avoid prefiling foreclosure sales. 129 In doing so,
the Court explained,
It is beyond question that an essential state interest is at issue here:
We have said that "the general welfare of society is involved in the
security of the titles to real estate" and the power to ensure that
security "inheres in the very nature of [state] government." Nor is
there any doubt that the interpretation urged by petitioner would
have a profound effect upon that interest: The title of every piece
of realty purchased at foreclosure would be under a federally created cloud. (Already, title insurers have reacted to the Durrett rule
by including specially crafted exceptions from coverage in many
policies issued for properties purchased at foreclosure sales [) 113
BFPwas a policy-driven stretch of the Bankruptcy Code language; undoubtedly, the Court's fear was that permitting bankruptcy courts to
upset later state foreclosure sales would, in the long run, depress foreclosure sale prices.
If the preference power associated with the bankruptcy-only carve
out could be used to avoid the sale to Buyer, the federally created
cloud again would be on every piece of property sold at a foreclosure
127

The Ninth Circuit has held that current law does not permit this action. In re Ehr-

ing, 900 F.2d 184, 189 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to set aside as a preference a foreclosure
sale in which the secured creditor was the bargain purchaser).
128 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
129 Id. at 545 (holding that a reasonably equivalent price is one received at the foreclosure sale, so long as there has been no violation of state requirements).
130 Id. at 544 (citation omitted) (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60
(1911)).
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sale.1 3 ' The only differences would be that it would be a preference
cloud rather than a fraudulent transfer cloud and that, in many instances, the cloud would extend for ninety days rather than for a full
year. However, in most cases, the shorter time period would be of
little comfort to Buyer because sophisticated debtors or unsecured
creditors who wished to avoid the sale would, as a matter of strategy,
file the bankruptcy earlier so that the transfer could be recovered.
If, as seems more reasonable, preference law bars recovery from
the purchaser at sale and permits recovery only from the creditors
receiving the proceeds of sale, strategies available to secured creditors
liquidating collateral in the shadow of bankruptcy would be capable of
defeating recovery altogether. To illustrate, Debtor seeking financing
equal to the $1 million liquidation value of a project might obtain a
mortgage in the amount of $1 million from Secured Creditor. Secured Creditor might raise the $1 million by borrowing the bulk of it
from a-bank, secured by an interest in the mortgage. If Secured Creditor later forced a foreclosure sale of the project and recovered its $1
million, Secured Creditor would immediately distribute those proceeds to the bank and to its investors, leaving Secured Creditor an
empty shell. If Debtor filed for bankruptcy while the liquidation was
still within the preference period, Trustee's action to recover the preference would be futile. Trustee could not recover against Secured
Creditor because Secured Creditor would have no assets. Trustee
could recover against neither the bank nor the investors because they
are subsequent transferees who have taken "for value, including satisfaction ...[of an] antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided."'13 2
Even if the courts held such transfers avoidable as preferences,
that would not insure recovery. Today, large amounts of capital are
raised in capital markets through securitization at competitive
costs. 13 3 If the funds loaned in the preceding transaction were raised

from thousands of investors in the securities markets, and repaid to
them immediately upon liquidation of the collateral, preference re-

131
That is, if the debtor whose property was sold went into bankruptcy within 90 days
after the sale, a carve out preference action would lie against the buyer at the sale. If the
debtor did not, the buyer would not be subject to the carve out.
132 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1) (1994). Neither the bank nor the investors could have had
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer, because the transfer was not voidable at the
time they received their interest. See, e.g., Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank,
838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that where debtor paid third party who directed
bank as subsequent transferee to apply the funds to satisfaction of third party's debt to
bank, trustee could not recover from bank).
133
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 133, 146-51 (1994) (arguing that securitization reduces net financing costs).
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covery would be impractical. The cost of recovering small amounts
84
from thousands of investors would exceed the amounts recovered.
This illustration suggests that adoption of a preference rule that
prohibits recovery from Buyer at a foreclosure sale might result in
lenders routinely employing such techniques. The effect would be to
make the carve out ineffective against transactions by sophisticated
parties. Ultimately, the problem is that preference actions are actions
to recover on unsecured debts; such recovery is highly problematic.
SUMiARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In their 1987 debate, Warren and Baird demonstrated the crucial
link between legal rules that operate only in bankruptcy and the bankruptcy triggering process. Ideally, the system would have two sets of
collection rules: one for the single troublesome debt, the other for
debtors in widespread default and collapse. But that requires some
means of separating the two kinds of cases. It is far from clear that the
means thus far proposed would be effective. In any event, neither
bankruptcy scholars nor the larger bankruptcy community seem disposed to make the radical changes that would be necessary to force
collapsing debtors into bankruptcy.
As matters now stand, most debtors liquidate portions of their
estates before bankruptcy and irrevocably fix the distributions of the
remainder by granting security interests. The bankruptcy system lacks
an effective mechanism for triggering its operation in time to avoid
the debtor's transactions as preferences. The result is a system malfunction in two respects. First, there are insufficient unencumbered
assets with which to administer the bankruptcy estate or reorganize
the debtor in an appropriate case. Second, the bankruptcy policy in
favor of pro rata distribution is given little effect.
Adoption of a bankruptcy-only carve out is likely to make the situation worse. Particularly in liquidation cases, the carve out will increase the incentives for the debtor-secured creditor alliance to
accomplish the liquidation outside bankruptcy more than it will increase the incentives of unsecured creditors to accomplish liquidation
in bankruptcy. Because the debtor-secured creditor alliance generally
will succeed in liquidating the collateral under nonbankruptcy law,
184 See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,91 COLUM. L. REV.
1565, 1612 (1991) ("[T]he transaction costs of collecting from small shareholders would
significantly blunt its effect."); LoPucki, supranote 89, at 56-57 (arguing the impracticality

of bringing such actions); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and VicariousLiability of CorporateParticipantsfor Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1, 20 (1994)
([T]he costs would consume the benefit of collecting from many small shareholdings so
that enforcement is [un]likely ...

to be feasible .

. .

. "). But see Henry Hansmann &

Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879, 1900-01 (1991) (arguing that substantial collection could be effected).
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the carve out will have little effect on bankruptcy distributions. For
that reason, it will have little effect on lending or prebankruptcy settlement practices.
Perhaps the principal effect of a bankruptcy-only carve out will be
to generate system-unintended strategic activity. While the bottom
line will be much the same, the debtor-secured creditor alliance will
incur substantial transaction costs in getting there. Familiar simplicity
will give way to unfamiliar complexity.

